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In this article I use an interpretation of Saskia Sassen’s ‘cross-border geographies’ as a framing 
mechanism for the operations of human rights activists in the Thai-Burma borderlands. I argue 
that these activists use aspects of the national territories they traverse, such as who belongs and 
associated rights and obligations, as well as state capital and services. But they also act outside 
of state sovereignty, in particular through digital infrastructures and transnational networking 
that connect to other national territories, and their irregular movement across the national 
border. In this way, human rights activists both operate within national territories and in ways 
that violate their sovereignty. Activist operations are enabled by an informality attached to the 
Thai-Burma border, its marginal status to central control, its pragmatic approach to state 
operations, and its porous nature to flows of information and people. Tighter regulation of these 
territories, particularly as the adjoining states attempt to exert their authority, is likely to impact 
the ongoing operations of human rights activists in the Thai-Burma borderlands. Cross-border 
geographies therefore provide a means for the critical examination of activist operations that 
occur within and across state and non-state spaces. 












Saw Kyi1 has been documenting human rights abuses against the Karen for 
almost two decades. He calls himself a ‘community worker’ and a ‘human rights 
defender’. While he is a Karen man from Burma2, he has spent most of that 
time in and around the Thai town of Mae Sot. When I first spoke to him in 
2005, he led a fairly transient life. He sometimes lived in Mae Sot, sometimes 
in Mae La refugee camp, about an hour north of Mae Sot. He was often inside 
Karen State documenting human rights abuses or conducting community 
organising training. In Mae Sot, he developed children’s education programs, 
wrote up human rights reports and networked with global human rights 
agencies, activists and sympathisers. He was devoted to his work, and the 
ultimate liberation of his people. When I asked why he didn’t seek resettlement 
to a third country like many of his peers were doing, he replied: ‘I love to stay 
here because it’s close to my community, my people’. It was a sentiment echoed 
by another human rights documenter who told me: ‘Because I can do something 
here for the people inside Burma and along the border, so I don’t want to 
resettle’. Saw Kyi had written a song about this connection, the importance of 
staying, of being an active agent. He talked about the land of Kawthoolei (a 
reference to Karen State)—rich in rivers, gold and teak—that had provided for 
its Karen people, yet was now under threat of destruction from the Burmese 
military and the drive to resettle the Karen in third countries, far from 
Kawthoolei’s gaze. For Saw Kyi, he needed to stay and protect his people and 
his land, he felt this as an obligation. 
Central to Saw Kyi’s life, and his human rights activist work, is the Thai-Burma 
borderlands (Sharples 2018) and the international boundary that cuts through 
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it. Saw Kyi refers to the Thai-Burma border as a communications channel, a 
conduit if you like, between displaced persons inside Burma and the 
international community. He is talking about the geographical location but also 
about the attributes of the space—in a pragmatic sense, its infrastructure, 
resources, accessibility, but also in a more abstract sense, its spatial aspiration 
as a site of refuge and activism. In 2007 he described the border like this: 
It’s something like a strategy plan. You stay here [Thailand], you plan here, you 
arrange every day here and then you go inside…Inside you do more effective 
work but in a different way…For example, human right documenters may do 
their work every day inside. Here along the border if you would like to do 
community organising training so you need the information. You can access the 
internet, do research, collect information, then you go inside and do the training, 
it depends on your work. 
At the time he was speaking, Saw Kyi was capturing the Border’s utility; it had 
several functions relevant to his work. He was able to cross a national border 
and enter zones (inside Burma) where human rights abuses were known or 
expected and typically extracted or documented the information needed and 
then left again—to package that information in a way that could bring global 
attention to the issue. Being in the borderlands space provided close 
geographical proximity to these conflict zones but also to ‘home’, sustaining his 
connection to Karen land, people and culture. The border also had a tangible 
quality, for it represented a line where access to resources could be obtained. 
From the Thai side of the border Saw Kyi had internet access and therefore 
could connect into global flows around information, knowledge and resources. 
He had better access to skills and training that could help develop his work. He 
also had the opportunity to reach a wide global audience through international 
networks, digital platforms and transnational connections.  
Human rights activists like Saw Kyi are deeply embedded in the borderlands 
space, and importantly they are most likely to be from an ethnic minority group 
who are the recipient of such abuses. They have a vested interest in 
documenting and resolving the conflict as well as providing invaluable access 
to and knowledge of the context in which these abuses occur. Regardless of 
who funds or uses their work—and this can be varied, from local community 





rights documenters were mostly Karen activists who had fled persecution in 
Burma.  
Human rights activists are present in the Thai-Burma borderlands for obvious 
reasons. Burma has been defined by its militarised conflicts for at least six 
decades. Successive military dictatorships have targeted ethnic minority 
groups, particularly in Burma’s border areas. This is largely to do with a 
combination of the violent repression of ethnic representation in Burma’s post-
colonial political setting and a strategic directive to develop and control the 
border areas due to their economic potential, particularly the presence of 
natural resources which feed large-scale investment projects. These human 
rights abuses are well documented (see for example, reports by Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, the United Nations and the Karen Human Rights 
Group), and they have, particularly since the 1980s, seen large refugee flows 
across Burma’s borders and into neighbouring states. According to recent 
estimates there are 96,000 refugees in camps along the Thai-Burma border 
(TBC 2019) and since 2017 more than 750,000 Rohingya refugees in camps 
along the Bangladeshi border (UNHCR 2019). Many of these refugee flows 
go undocumented, and there is a large body of displaced persons that remain 
inside Burma, meaning these figures under-represent the larger picture of 
persecution and displacement in Burma over the last forty years.  
While the focus of this article is on the Karen and the Thai-Burma border, it 
should be noted that human rights violations can be found against the Rohingya 
in Rakhine State, the Kachin in Kachin State, and the Shan and Karenni also 
along the Thai-Burma border, among others. Recent reports show the ongoing 
nature of the conflict, over a million displaced Rohingya and more than 320 
Rohingya villages destroyed in Rakhine State (ASPI 2019), Burmese military 
attacks on KIA outposts in Kachin State which have caused significant civilian 
displacement and deaths (HRW 2018) and ongoing displacements due to 
clearing and artillery operations in Karen, Shan and Kachin states (TBC 2018). 
As a result, Burma’s borders with neighbouring countries have come to harbour 
a range of human rights documenters and activists. This ranges in formality and 
structure. There is the intermittent presence of large human rights organisations 
like Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International and international 
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agencies such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The more constant presence 
were the community-based human rights organisations such as the Karen 
Human Rights Group (KHRG), Burma Issues and the Human Rights 
Documentation Unit (HRDU) which produced the highly influential Burma 
Human Rights Yearbooks. Working across all these levels though, are the 
human rights documenters. These are the Karen people who go inside Burma 
to document the abuses, often at great personal risk, and whose raw material 
feeds back into the formal human rights reports of the global organisations 
mentioned above and international news reporting, but also through informal 
grassroots channels, particularly social media and other participatory digital 
formats and Karen-language reporting. It is the work of these human rights 
documenters which is the focus of this article, for they constitute a partial 
annexing of neighbouring territories for the purposes of human rights work, 
basing themselves in countries like Thailand and drawing on their resources 
and services. They traverse this space in ways that seem partially autonomous 
of the territories and mechanisms of the system of nation-states, though not 
entirely removed from it. I therefore use this article to examine the spatialisation 
of human rights activism along the Thai-Burma border, and in particular through 
the activism of displaced Karen. This article looks specifically at activists who 
document human rights abuses. I examine this particular iteration for a number 
of reasons. 1. They employ frequent and repeated mobilities across the 
national border and through multiple national territories, 2. They operationalise 
these spaces through complex and mobile allegiances to territory (not always 
nationally constructed) and political authority, and 3. Through their work, they 
utilise cross-border geographies across national territories, for example 
international networks, new technologies and material infrastructure (skills, 
training, resources). These three points characterise both the work of human 
rights activists and the spatial dimensions in which they operate. Of particular 
interest to me then, is how this activism is operationalised across multiple 
sovereign territories, not just the abutting states of Thailand and Burma, but 
more widely through connections into other national territories and bodies.  
A further two clarifications are required here, one around time and the other 





activism pre-2011, though I do make some reference to events and trends after 
2011 particularly where they provide insight into the changing nature of the 
space for human rights activists. There is an important purpose for choosing this 
period of time. From the mid-1980s up to Burma’s general election in 2011, 
though certainly not exclusive to this period of time, human rights violations in 
Burma were prolific and had great impact. Consequently, a raft of international 
human rights policies and administering organisations established themselves 
in the borderlands space, tasked with documenting and disseminating evidence 
of violations, but also training local populations in human rights awareness and 
human rights documentation (Brooten 2004; 2008). At the same time, 
international media brought global attention to these violations, meaning 
human rights violations in Burma were both widely evident and reported as 
well as prioritised by leading human rights agencies and governments looking 
for resolutions. During this period the Thai authorities largely tolerated the 
presence of human rights activists on their territory and human rights work 
received significant international support in terms of finances and resources. 
Lastly, I believe that post-2011 there was a shift in how international entities 
sought to address human rights violations, moving away from their support of 
grassroots documentation initiatives and towards more diplomatic engagement 
with the Burmese government. Taken together, these provided a unique set of 
characteristics that defined human rights activism during this period of time, 
making it not only a worthy era to study but one that can potentially provide 
valuable insights for other locales.  
The second clarification is around terminology. While the focus of this article is 
on how human rights activists traverse the borderlands space, it is worth noting 
the terms under which I use the word activism. I take a broad definitional 
approach to the concept, as an act/s meant to effect some sort of social or 
political change. In other words, in documenting the abuse, activists also 
advocate for an outcome of systemic change that can resolve or stop the abuse 
(for example this might be to hold perpetrators accountable, effect collective 
change, or change the political systems/structures that allow the abuse to 
occur). I should also note that there are many forms of activism in the 
borderlands—environmental activism, democracy activism, online activism, 
activism around specific issues such as LBTQIA rights, disability rights, gender 
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equity, to name a few. Many of these can be broadly deemed as addressing 
human rights concerns.  
It is important to note that in the borderlands one can’t distinguish between 
these concerns; they are inseparable experiences for many activists in the 
borderlands. Human rights documenters may document human rights abuses 
related to an environmental development or in calling for action on human 
rights abuses also be calling for democratic change. Conversely, human rights 
activists don’t occupy binary categories—in addition to being human rights 
activists they may also see themselves as a refugee or displaced person, as 
being both political and surviving, as living in both domestic and public spheres, 
and as being victim and agent. These issues are collapsed into what O’Kane 
calls ‘inseparable experiences’ (2005, p. 15), so while I focus on human rights 
documenters it is important to also consider the broader sphere of 
activism/living in which they operate. 
In the sections below I examine these claims. First, I provide some historical 
background to the Thai-Burma borderlands as a site of activism, particularly its 
history as a location at the periphery of state control and its positioning as a 
space of refuge for those seeking to evade state power and control. I then 
examine some of the operations of power that are enacted in the borderlands. 
This helps illustrate the multiple, complex power structures (particularly those 
that operate outside of state mechanisms) that work to enable the cross-border 
activities of human rights documenters. Finally, I use Saskia Sassen’s concept 
of ‘cross-border geographies’ as a frame to examine the spatialisation of 
human rights activism in the borderlands, particularly as it pertains to the 
operationalisation of human rights work within and across nation-state 
territories.  
The data used in this article is derived from ethnographic fieldwork that was 
undertaken between 2005 and 2011, but also from my ongoing research 
engagement with activists in the Thai-Burma borderlands over the last 15 years. 
Over this time, I have spoken with dozens of human rights activists about the 
nature of their work, their motivations and expectations, the logistics of 
documenting human rights abuses and the types of networks and connections 





in Tak Province, Thailand. Mae Sot was chosen because of its strong 
association with displaced Karen, its links to political opposition groups, and its 
geographical, metaphorical and spatial characteristics as a border town and 
therefore a gateway for cross-border movements. Many international human 
rights organisations have based themselves there, as have many Burmese 
opposition groups. It has a highly mobile population of journalists, researchers, 
aid workers, missionaries, academics, migrant workers and activists, including 
those with a focus on documenting human rights abuses. The activists I spoke 
with were predominantly Karen. Most had lived along the border for up to 20 
years, but almost all had experienced persecution and displacement by the 
Burmese military that led to them fleeing across the border into Thailand. These 
activists were employed by a range of organisations such as community-based 
human rights groups, formal human rights documentation units, and 
international human rights agencies. 
‘Ungoverned Territories’? The Thai-Burma borderlands as a 
site of activism 
The Thai-Burma borderlands has long been an operational site for human rights 
activism, both as a protective casement for the emplacement of human rights 
activists and as a means for resourcing activist movements. The presence of 
activists on the Thai side of the border must be understood in the larger context 
of the dispersal of political authority in Burma. Burma’s peripheries or border 
areas have historically been largely autonomous sites removed from the control 
of a central governing authority. Prior to the advent of the modern-political 
map, pre-colonial Burma consisted of a number of semi-autonomous regions 
which were defined by ‘regional and dynastic conflicts’ (Lieberman 1978, p. 
458). Lieberman referred to this power dynamic as ‘satellite centres’ which 
orbit the ‘galactic polity’ (1978, p. 461). Satellite centres constituted regional 
leaders at the periphery who maintained their autonomy in the face of a central 
power, usually the monarchy but otherwise a customary leader rather than the 
notion of a nation-state. Population movement between geographical places 
was determined by allegiances to patrons rather than a central power 
(Lieberman 1978, p. 459) and power comprised of control of people rather 
than territory (Steinberg 1987, p. 30). Pongsawat (2007) also notes that 
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political power had more to do with spatial organisations of tribute, taxation 
and capturing manpower, than any sense of territorial gain.  
Some scholars have shown that mobility, particular the movement of refugees 
or fugitives from the state, has a long history in Southeast Asia. Even in the pre-
cartographic, pre-modern era, the peripheries acted as sanctuaries for those 
who wished to evade capture by the central authorities (Scott 2009; Renard 
1986). In his book The Art of Not Being Governed (2009), James C Scott 
argued that the borderlands were non-state spaces that provided refuge for 
people evading state-making mechanisms such as taxes or labour but who also 
wished to establish livelihoods outside of state control. Burma’s precolonial 
period is noted for the failure of the central power (the monarchy) to control 
local authorities at these peripheries (Adas 1981, p. 221). The further from the 
centre the more diminished state power became, and this was further 
consolidated by the failure of ‘the administrative system to penetrate the village 
level’ (Adas 1981, p. 222). Cartographic efforts to map these frontier areas 
under the domain of a central power was an attempt to create a state 
government with associated territory and the ‘geo-body of a nation’ where it 
had never existed (Winichakul 1994). In other words, the territories that now 
constitute Burma were never successfully governed by a central political 
authority, and both the colonial administration and the later military 
dictatorships struggled to establish a strong position of state power, eventually 
instigating bureaucracies that attempted to control these outer areas, either 
through policy or force, that continue to this day.  
This is an important historical trajectory as it lays the foundations for the 
mobility, autonomy and political devolution of the borderlands that activists 
have utilised in the modern setting. Activists move to Burma’s peripheries 
because it positions them far from the reach of state power and as I argue 
above, Burma’s peripheries have a long history of accommodating this type of 
mobility. Activists have largely retained that position because they make 
allegiances, often precarious ones, with local authorities who have traditionally 
held power in these border regions (Pongsawat 2007; Gravers 2007). They 
are able to operate in such spaces due to the ambiguous operationalisation of 
political power and the mobility and connectivity of the space across nation-





borderlands are not a phenomenon of the modern era, but rather have deep 
roots in historical uses of the space.  
In addition to these historical factors, there are a number of contemporary 
political reasons the Thai side of the border has come to harbour activists from 
Burma. In the post-independence era in particular, displaced persons made 
their way to the Thai-Burma border to escape Burmese government or military 
persecution. On the Thai side of the border they found some level of protection 
from the conflict, including refuge and for some settlement in local communities 
or later, in established refugee camps (Lang 2002). Thailand was often seen 
as a temporary haven, and those displaced would return to Burma when 
fighting abated and their safety allowed. However, as the intensity of Burmese 
military attacks increased throughout the 1980s, the Thai side of the border 
took on more permanent characteristics. Repeated waves of refugees and 
political actors arrived at the border, changing the political nature of the space. 
There has been a significant opposition or resistance presence along the Thai-
Burma border since at least the 1960s, often mirroring both global trends and 
the various phases of Burma’s conflict. In the 1960s and 70s the Thai-Burma 
borderlands was a haven for communist groups such as the Communist Party 
of Burma and communist sympathisers who had strong support from China but 
were targeted by the Burmese dictatorship. From the 1960s this has also 
included ethnic minority opposition parties, militias and coalitions, such as the 
Karen National Union (KNU), the National Democratic United Front (NDUF) 
and the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC). From the late 1980s it also included 
coalitions that formed as a result of the 1988 student uprising such as All Burma 
Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) and pro-democracy Burmese opposition 
political groups or parties such as the National Coalition Government of the 
Union of Burma (NCGUB) (for comprehensive accounts of some of these 
groups see Smith 1999; Fink 2009). The 2000s saw more grassroots, issue-
driven human rights groups dominate the borderlands, such as the Karen River 
Watch (environment), Karen Human Rights Group (human rights 
documentation) and Karen Women’s Organisation (gender and community 
leadership), to name a few. Some of these groups have established formal 
networks and structures which continue in some form to do this day, making the 
borderlands an historically rich environment for opposition, resistance and 
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activism, and largely able to operate through a mixture of informal support and 
ambivalence from the Thai state. The presence of these groups along the border 
can be partially attributed to the absence of the Burmese and Thai states from 
the day-to-day operations of these border regions, at least until the 1980s 
anyway. Border operations and practices were largely administered by local 
authorities with little interference from the central government. The border 
operated under an informal ‘buffer zone’, where the Thai state negotiated with 
various ethnic minority groups for the security of its border, rather than with the 
Burmese state. The buffer zone was a legacy of the Cold War era, where it 
acted as a barrier stopping communists in China, Burma and Thailand from 
linking up (Lintner 1992; Fink 2009) as well as using ethnic minority groups to 
provide cross-border intelligence on Burmese politics and as a defence against 
Burmese military attacks (Sharples, in press). The buffer zone was quietly 
dismantled throughout the 1990s so that by the early-2000s there was clear 
evidence that Thailand had moved away from its localised relationships with 
ethnic minority groups and towards a more formal relationship with Burma’s 
governing power.  
Over the last three decades, both states have shown increased interest in their 
shared border and its surrounding territory. From the mid-1990s there was a 
clear re-ordering of the relationship between the Burmese and Thai states. This 
was largely driven by economic interests, in particular business opportunities 
such as the extraction of natural resources and development programs, and to 
take back territory and control from ethnic opposition groups. The two states 
developed a tenuous relationship that was an uneasy balance between 
historical distrust and animosity and a bourgeoning diplomatic relationship 
based largely on economic self-interest. As Burma emerged from thirty years 
of isolationist policy to embrace an ‘open door’ economic policy, Thailand was 
eager to make the most of economic development agreements with its resource-
rich neighbour. While Thailand has typically housed activists from Burma, it is 
not without some self-interest and unpredictability. The precarious relationship 
between the Thai and Burmese states often dictates the level of this hospitality. 
Thailand has generally provided informal support to activists from Burma. This 
has often created diplomatic tensions with the Burmese state, culminating in 





heated diplomatic discussions and sanctions. The Thai state has also at various 
points, cracked down on activists, detaining and deporting them as well as 
severely regulating their movement and activities in the borderlands. For 
example, throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s there were periodic 
deportations back across the border—in one instance there were reports of the 
forcible repatriation of 31 Burmese student activists exiled members of the NLD 
via the checkpoint at Sangklaburi—as well as temporary closures or relocations 
of human rights organisations because of the intensity of Thai state attention or 
enforcement. 
While this precarity made the situation of human rights activists in Thailand 
tenuous, it also created an environment where human rights activists operated 
by partially using sovereignty, or its lack of, as a protective barrier from the 
Burmese state, and as a means to conduct unregulated activities. While I will 
largely argue for cross-border geographies that partially obscure nation-state 
borders, this should not discount the relevance of national territorial sovereignty 
and the tangibility of the border. Many human rights activists from Burma have 
deliberately placed themselves outside the control of the nation-state (of 
Burma), by emplacing themselves across the border in Thailand. By crossing 
the border into Thailand and working from that national territory they are 
giving credence to the national border. The border becomes a real, tangible 
line on the ground, representing a spatial configuration where safety and 
security to do human rights work can be found. In other words, the ambiguous, 
volatile, mobile, penetrative, somewhat ungovernable nature of the space is 
exactly what enabled the ongoing work of human rights activists. That work is 
defined by the ways in which human rights activists partially utilised the 
mechanisms of national sovereign spaces, but also operated outside of them, 
creating a unique setting in which human rights activism was able to traverse 
the interstate system. 
Operations of power in the borderlands 
In part, human rights activists have been able to negotiate the borderlands in 
this way due to the multiple, complex operations of power that occur within 
and across the space. Before examining the operationalisation of human rights 
activism as it pertains to cross-border geographies, as I do in the next section, 
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it is important to understand what some of these key operations of power are 
and how they shape the cross-border activities of human rights activists. I should 
also note that this is not a comprehensive listing of these complex operations, 
but rather a typography of those systems that more specifically inform the work 
of human rights activists. 
While we have seen the strengthening of the global order of nation-states, 
particularly in the 20th century, many parts of the world, Thailand and Burma 
included, have fledgling nation-states and historically dispersed systems of 
authority (Winichakul 1994; Adas 1981; Scott 2009). While their political 
trajectories differ, Thailand and Burma have never been particularly strong 
nation-states, and multiple systems of rule, and therefore dispersed authorities 
of power have been able to thrive, particularly in the countries’ border areas. 
The complex array of agents and operations of power that occur in the 
borderlands has led Mary Callahan to observe that ‘political authority rests in 
the hands of what seems like to outside observers to be a bewildering array of 
government agencies, warlords, military and paramilitary units, gangsters, 
foreign firms and syndicates, religious groups and nongovernmental 
organisations’ (2007, p.48). These operations of power provide important, 
sometimes discrete, sometimes intertwined conditions for the work of human 
rights activists. For example, for many decades, ethnic militias controlled the 
informal gateways between Burma and Thailand (Smith 1999; Ball and 
Mathieson 2007). This meant human rights activists could negotiate entry and 
exit conditions with local, sympathetic authorities that operated autonomously 
of the state and were likely from the same ethnic minority group as them. Thai 
local authorities also typically determined the level of hospitality towards 
human rights activists from Burma, both accommodating their presence in 
Thailand and to some extent providing protection, while making it difficult 
enough to cause heightened levels of insecurity and in some cases putting lives 
and work at risk. 
Another way to look at the operations of power in the borderlands is the way 
in which the work of human rights activists is often directed by global funders. 
Funders can, and do, influence the types of human rights work undertaken, as 
well as the location and duration of that work, and how and where it might be 





assistance groups receiving US$30-$40 million per year to provide food, 
shelter and medical assistance (Callahan, 2007 p. 37), this is a significant level 
of funding. Many international funders have withdrawn from the Thai-Burma 
border since 2011 to pursue work inside Burma, having a significant negative 
impact on groups working along the border. For example, The Border 
Consortium, the key nongovernmental organisation providing food and shelter 
to the refugee camp populations, has reported a 56% decrease in income over 
the period 2014-2018, with many long-term donors withdrawing their financial 
support (TBC 2018).  
These withdrawals have influenced the nature of the work being done on 
Burma, re-orientating priorities to development work and obscuring the 
importance of human rights work. Global funding of human rights work is 
obtained through complex transnational channels—from traditional avenues 
such as foreign government aid to more opaque private entities like faith-based 
organisations and supporters of armed resistance. These latter funding avenues 
are often privatised operations that provide limited public accountability or 
assessment of the impact and effectiveness of their work, yet they have 
provided some of the most sustained funding towards human rights work in 
Burma. 
Linked to funds, is the larger context of international support that moves beyond 
simply aid. This has included a largely sympathetic international media that 
have typically portrayed the Karen as the recipients of human rights abuses 
locked in a struggle against a brutal authoritarian dictatorship/government. 
The media has proved an important partner in awareness raising as well as 
mobilising support for action against these abuses. But it has also had undue 
influence over the nature and reporting of human rights abuses—to some 
degree setting an agenda that prioritises the funding of work that is ‘political’ 
and that supports the human rights documentation work done by ethnic 
minorities. Lisa Brooten is critical of this positioning as the prevalent norm, 
arguing that it can provide a narrow interpretation of human rights that reifies 
existing inequalities among the various groups in Burma (2004, p. 176). 
Brooten provides an example that when the documentation of human rights 
abuses becomes the key media portrayal of Burma’s conflict, and the basis for 
support of international governments and funders, there is an imperative for 
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human rights documenters to seek out human rights abuses, ‘leading to a 
devaluation of other aspects of villagers’ lives, including the ways in which they 
are active agents rather than passive victims’ (2004, p. 187). A human rights 
discourse provides many benefits, but unchecked it also has disquieting 
limitations, particularly when it becomes a dominant framing that governs the 
operationalisation of the space. 
Another key operation of power in the Thai-Burma borderlands is the role of 
ethnic armed groups. This can be varied depending on who the armed group 
is. Ethnic armed groups often held powerful and lucrative positions in the Thai-
Burma borderlands, controlling unofficial border checkpoints and informal 
cross-border trade (Smith 1999). They also often provide services and 
resources that the state has failed to deliver, such as education, health and 
protection to populations in the conflict zones (McConnachie 2012; South et 
al. 2010). In addition, they have portrayed themselves as the protectors of 
civilian populations against Burmese military attacks, embedding themselves in 
a narrative of victim-protector that can often obscure their own role in human 
rights abuses. In terms of human rights activities, ethnic armed groups like the 
KNLA ensured humanitarian and human rights organisations had access to 
conflict areas when many international humanitarian organisations were 
denied entry (Horstmann 2014; McConnachie 2012). They often had intimate 
knowledge of the terrain in which human rights abuses were occurring and 
provided wayfare through unpredictable geographies (for example knowing 
landmine positions and Burmese military battalion locations). This often took 
the form of an armed escort, creating what Callahan has identified as a 
situation that reinforces the Burmese government’s claims that ‘…these areas 
are legitimate (by the Government’s standards) targets of counterinsurgency 
campaigns’ (2008, p. 36). Armed groups can act as informants to where 
human rights abuses are occurring, including providing first-hand 
documentation of such events if they were directly involved. Many of the human 
rights activists I spoke with talked of the crucial role that ethnic armed groups 
played in ensuring safe movement through territorial spaces, and that these 
negotiations were likely to take place at the level of local ethnic minority 
leadership. There are of course challenges and concerns when operating in 





when ethnic armed groups can also be perpetrators of human rights abuses. 
However, it is worth noting the prominent role played by armed groups in the 
operations of the borderlands space. 
As a space that is subject to multiple operations of power—local authorities, 
global funders, international agencies (refugee camps), nation-states, and 
armed groups—the Thai-Burma borderlands is a site of complex, localised 
negotiations of power and control. A principle aspect of these multiple 
operations of power is that the state occupies a reduced position of authority. 
The rules are dispersed through a much wider group of authorities and within 
a more fluid set of parameters. This should not necessarily be seen as a 
negative but rather the reality of how power operates in the borderlands, 
resulting in a complex system of political authority that would be better utilised 
to effect change than a one-size-fits-all approach. Many of the cross-border 
geographies I have discussed in this article are not immediately evident; some 
even rely on their obfuscation to operate. This masking is an important 
characteristic of the space; it allows certain things to occur, largely because 
they operate out of view and largely because they are not confined to the more 
rigid structures of the state apparatus. For human rights activists, this ability to 
operate across multiple interstate borders and through various models of 
authority, defines both the operationalisation of their work and the nature of 
the borderlands space. 
Cross-border geographies  
Saskia Sassen’s work on ‘cross-border geographies’ is a useful framework for 
how the operationalisation of human rights work in the Thai-Burma borderlands 
can be understood. A key aspect of Sassen’s cross-border geographies is her 
articulation of a spatial aberration, in a broad sense the operationalisation of 
practices that can occur within but also outside of the nation-state. She describes 
it as a process: ‘… that include only parts of national territories, often excluding 
most of the pertinent sovereign territory that houses them’, and that these ‘cross-
border geographies cut across multiple interstate borders with considerable 
ease’ (2018, p.7). Sassen talks of the multiple regimes [operations of power] 
that constitute the border as a novel type of borderings, ‘that function largely 
outside the framing of the interstate system but are partly embedded in multiple, 
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often very diverse, national legal systems’ (2018, p. 6). These borderings are 
‘partly formalised, partly emergent, and partly not necessarily meant to be 
formalized nor to be particularly visible’ (2018, p. 7). Sassen looks at this 
dynamic in the context of corporations and global economic actors, and in 
particular as ‘extractive economies’ that construct operational spaces that sit 
outside of traditional national borders in order to meet their own needs (2018, 
p.13).  
I believe that Sassen’s larger argument around cross-border geographies also 
has some relevance to the borderings of human rights activists, a position she 
herself seems to hold (2018, p. 7). Sassen argues that in operating in spaces 
inside national territories but that also connect across national territories, 
entities create their own geographies, a ‘multi-sited connected geography’ 
(2018, p. 13). In the context of human rights activists, it might look something 
like this: a human rights activist locates themselves in the national territory of 
one country (a) and documents the human rights abuses of another sovereign 
territory (b). They seek to utilise the legal authority of an inter-state framework 
such as the UN or the ICC (c) to hold (b) to account for their human rights 
abuses. In traversing these interstate spaces, human rights activists operate 
within national sovereign territories but are also making connections across 
them. In some cases, they also operate in ambiguous, unregulated zones, 
removed from traditional state frameworks; this may be in the form of 
unregulated movement through state territories or global information flows that 
traverse national borders. Here, Sassen’s work on ‘ungoverned territories’ is 
useful, where she references operational spaces that occur throughout many 
countries, but that are not necessarily framed by state laws, structures or 
institutions and that operate within and across national sovereign space (2018; 
2006a/b). So that in addition to these cross-border operations, there are also 
multiple, interconnected trajectories that cut across this multi-sited geography, 
defining an operational space that connects across nation-state boundaries—
movement (people, information), resources (funds, training), legal authority 
(national sovereignty, international human rights frameworks), and domains 
(online/offline, formal/informal), some of which I expand upon below.  
The work of human rights activists in the Thai-Burma borderlands is 





partially utilises national territories and connects across nation-states. Much of 
the work of human rights activists in the borderlands is centred around a 
sovereign territory (Burma) that they have no legal status within—most have no 
Burmese citizenship, despite being born in the country and have no legal status 
to reside in the country. This lack of legal status makes their access to, and 
presence in the country complicated, but it does not stop them from entering or 
traversing Burma’s territory. In traversing the space, they are documenting 
human rights abuses predominantly enacted by the Burmese state. As recipients 
of these human rights abuses themselves, and despite their lack of legal status, 
Burma’s human rights activists have a vested interest in the political authority of 
the state, and its inherent rights and responsibilities towards its inhabitants. In 
other words, they are attempting to hold the state accountable to these 
principles. Here, national territorial sovereignty is both present and applicable. 
While inside Burma, one could argue human rights activists also utilise, or to 
some extent benefit from state infrastructures—they buy goods, they utilise 
transport, they traverse the road systems, they may even access healthcare.  
And while this is true in some instances, due to the sensitive nature of their work, 
most human rights activists would operate through more informal, localised 
systems that sit outside of state control and ownership. For example, they are 
more likely to stay in isolated or remote villages outside the gaze of the state 
or travel by foot to avoid state checkpoints. In this way their presence inside 
Burma is likely to go largely undocumented. There are no typical footprints—no 
entry/exit stamps, no leaving of personal details at accommodation sites, no 
tickets for public transport. The aim of a human rights activist is to tread lightly 
upon the state’s resources, so that their presence is unknown or at least 
shrouded from the state. In this way, they are partially utilising state 
infrastructure while also defying aspects of territorial sovereignty. They 
therefore have the capacity to operate both within the state system and outside 
of it. 
Another component of these cross-border geographies is the way that human 
rights activists cross multiple interstate borders, often with considerable ease 
given their stateless status. I don’t mean to minimise the dangers involved in 
their work, but rather highlight that for agents who lack passports or other 
formal identification, crossing national borders through informal channels is 
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both necessary and accessible to them because of this status. Human rights 
activists can cross the Thai-Burma border multiple times a year. This almost 
always occurs through informal channels, meaning there is no official 
documentation of their movement. This is almost an essential requirement for 
them to do their work and highlights the importance of being able to operate 
outside of the mechanisms of the state. As Saw Kyi stated at the beginning of 
this article, this cross-border movement is essential to his work. He needs to be 
inside Burma to document the human rights abuses and show solidarity to his 
people, but he also needs to be in Thailand to access training and resources, 
network with other local activists as well as globally, and organise the 
information he has collected and disseminate this to international audiences. It 
is essential that he is able to move within and through these two sovereign 
spaces. 
This ease of traversing national borders applies even more so to digital flows 
of information, international networking and material infrastructure—key tools 
of human rights activism. These mobile, largely inter-state structures are not 
confined to territorial spaces, though they can be situated there. A significant 
game-changer for the conflict in Burma, was the arrival of highly mobile, global, 
digital networks to the borderlands, particularly from the early-2000s. These 
included new technologies (video, internet), new media (blogs, chat platforms, 
social media) and more sophisticated messaging (a combination of resources, 
strategy and training). There is also a temporal element to human rights activism 
in the borderlands in this digital era. Documentation and dissemination can 
occur almost simultaneously and in real-time. With an internet connection, 
evidence of human rights violations can be recorded and uploaded for almost-
instant reporting. Human rights violations can also be documented through 
digitised systems that do not require documentation by a human, for example 
mapping housing and land destruction using GIS software. While this has been 
documented to some degree (Brooten 2008; Brooten et al. 2019; Sharples, in 
press), it remains an under-researched area with important implications for 
transversal borderings. In many senses, these transversal mobilities represent a 
paradoxical shrinking of the world; a subjective shrinking of geographical 
space that is associated with an expansion of consciousness related to ideas, 





For example, a Karen person can sit in Thailand (with no legal status) and 
share human rights abuses they have collected from inside Burma, via the web, 
to dispersed communities throughout Europe, America or Australia. Using 
alternative methods, they can also share this information with Karen back inside 
Burma. They can further compile information gained from this dispersed 
community and submit human rights reports to the UN in Geneva or a foreign 
government which could apply pressure to Burma’s military government to 
cease its oppressive practices. In the end, this information will have traversed 
countless national borders and political systems, without facing nation-state 
border restrictions, in an attempt to resolve a localised predicament. It is 
possible that this constitutes a system that challenges nation-state boundaries on 
a fundamental level; a system that is reconstituting our conceptual 
understanding of geographic distance and spatial control (Sassen 2006b; 
Soguk & Whitehall 1999). While these trajectories pass through national 
spaces, one can argue that they operate in partially ungoverned spaces when 
it comes to the reach of the nation-state. As Sassen states: 
I see, rather, a multiplication of what is beginning to happen today: the formation 
of partial, often very specialised, assemblages of bits and pieces of territory, of 
authority, of rights, that used to be lodged in national states. Some of these 
assemblages will be private, some public, some will continue to inhabit national 
spaces but be actually denationalised, others will be global (2006a). 
Sassen expands on this point in other areas of her work. She articulates a form 
of disaggregation of the unity of the nation-state, leading in part to the 
formation of novel global entities, but with the nation-state remaining the 
normative reference point (2006b). In this way we can understand instances of 
both a heightened prominence of territory and nationality, for example in the 
positioning of the Burmese state’s obligations towards its inhabitants, while at 
the same time instances of its decline, evidenced by assemblages that are 
defined by cross-border movement, the operationalisation of interstate spaces 
and the diminished authority of the state. 
While these cross-border geographies are often talked about as highly mobile, 
transversal linkages, somewhat abstract terms, they are often supported by 
some very tangible material infrastructures. The most evident of these in the 
borderlands are education and training opportunities enabled by global 
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funders and delivered by or at least supported by inter-state organisations and 
actors. Human rights activists have benefited from trainings on effective human 
rights documentation, use of multimedia platforms, and writing and 
presentation skills, particularly orientated towards an English-speaking 
international audience. These training and education workshops have upskilled 
local actors in the borderlands to run their own grassroots organisations and 
campaigns. We can see evidence of this in the highly visible sexual assault and 
rape reports in the 2000s (see the reports ‘License to Rape’ (SWAN & SHRF 
2002) and ‘Shattering Silences’ (KWO 2004) for example) and the Salween 
Watch Coalition’s campaign against the damming of the Salween River. This 
material infrastructure has also trained local journalists to be able to report on 
human rights abuses and community organisers to deliver human rights 
education and awareness trainings. This material infrastructure is 
operationalised through a complex set of cross-border movements—from the 
intricacies of global financial markets to the diplomacy of international 
governments and the transversal flows of information, knowledge and 
resourcing. As Sassen notes above, this creates assemblages of dispersed 
authority which contribute to the ongoing operationalisation of human rights 
work in the borderlands. Taken together, these aspects make the borderlands 
a highly contested, multi-scalar zone for inquiry. In the context of Burma’s 
ongoing political conflicts, it is a tangible line that both hinders mobility and 
attempts to contain political communities through processes of inclusion and 
exclusion. It is also, as I mention above, a line between threat and the feeling 
of safety. It can also be viewed as a ‘thick net’ of cross border social 
interactions (Acuto 2008), where transnational mobility—of people, resources, 
knowledge, information sharing—is tantamount to the operationalisation of 
space, particularly as a site of human rights activism. And finally, it is an 
operational space of cross-border geographies, where human rights activists 
place themselves within and across multiple state and non-state spaces. 
Conclusion: Where to for activism in the borderlands? 
Human rights activists in the Thai-Burma borderlands operationalise the space 
in ways that function outside of the territorial sovereignty of nation-states but 





geographies that characterise the space. They conduct frequent and repeated 
violations of national borders, through the mobility of peoples but also 
resources (material infrastructure), new technologies and global networking, 
and information and knowledge sharing. Human rights activists mobilise their 
work across multiple sovereign territories, not just mobilities between Thailand 
and Burma, but more widely through international agencies and organisations, 
and national governments who may fund or support their work in other ways. 
In this way, they work within complex, highly dispersed and fluid systems of 
authority. These highly mobile borderings both enable the work of human rights 
activists and are formed by their practices, creating a mutually beneficial 
relationship. 
Cross-border geographies—like highly mobile populations, global networks 
and new technologies—with their capacity to operate across national 
sovereignties, can strengthen the capacity and reach of human rights activists. 
These cross-border geographies offer viable alternatives for individuals and 
groups who have traditionally occupied weak positions within the state-making 
apparatus. Refugees, displaced persons, and the human rights activists who 
champion their cause, are able to form powerful and collaborative networks 
against the state, highlighting the importance of cross-border geographies for 
less powerful populations. 
While human rights activists in the Thai-Burma borderlands have benefited from 
a system that supports these cross-border geographies, there are significant 
risks to the ongoing viability of their work. An obvious one is the increased 
interest and expansion of the state into these territorial border areas. In Burma 
this has been deployed through heavy militarisation and economic 
development programs, in Thailand through greater regulation and policing of 
the border areas. This expansion of the state into the borderlands challenges 
the ongoing work of human rights activists—creating greater risks for their 
personal safety, but also greater regulation of essential mobilities. At the same 
time, the role or authority of the state can be seen to be shrinking, particularly 
in terms of the power and reach of global networks, human rights infrastructure 
and mechanisms and the mobility of people, ideas and resources that operate 
largely outside the framing of a system of nation-states.  
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In addition, the 2011 general elections in Burma had a significant impact on 
the spatialisation of human rights work in the Thai-Burma borderlands. The 
withdrawal of funders and international organisations from the borderlands, 
and the re-location of their work to inside Burma, has threatened the viability 
of human rights work, in its previous form anyway. Human rights activists have 
been forced into less formal, more mobile, digital spaces that are less reliant 
on material resources. This will likely have an impact on how human rights 
documentation will be used and for what purpose into the future. While the 
1990s and 2000s were dominated by human rights documentation that could 
be submitted to formal human rights bodies, like the United Nations, the current 
climate is more ambiguous and unsettling, at least in the short term. We are 
seeing more grassroots-driven, less formal, campaign-orientated uses of the 
human rights abuse material, facilitated largely by the internet and social media 
platforms. Diplomatic efforts at the governmental level have proved largely 
ineffectual; for example, the Burmese government continues to deny the 
allegations against them regarding their abuses of the Rohingya, leading to 
cases being brought against them by both the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Both cases are yet to run their 
due course, though it should be noted that the ICJ has no power to enforce 
punishment should the case be proved. 
It seems pertinent then to state that the Thai-Burma borderlands, and the human 
rights activists who operate there, provide a critical site to examine cross-border 
geographies that challenge our conceptualisation of sovereign territories and 
how they operate, particularly when it comes to their treatment of vulnerable 
populations. 
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Notes 
1 The names of Karen participants in this article are pseudonyms. This is to protect the 
privacy and safety of those who generously gave their time and stories to this research. 
2 Throughout this article I use the name ‘Burma’. Since the 2011 general election, 
‘Myanmar’ has been the more commonly used reference to the country, particularly in 
official channels. However, I use Burma as it was the most commonly used reference for the 
country during the period I discuss in this article. In addition, many of the Karen people I 
spoke with as part of this research used Burma, and out of respect for their wishes I have 
retained the use of Burma in reference to the country. 
 
